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1. INTRODUCTION
A gray market arises when a foreign manufacturer's goods, legiti-
mately sold abroad, are imported into the United States to compete
with those of the manufacturer who holds the United States trademark
rights in the identical trademark.' The gray marketeer is an "arbi-
trageur [who] takes advantage of a price difference between two mar-
kets by buying in the market where prices are lower and selling in the
market where prices are higher."' The market thrives on the unautho-
rized distributor's ability to sell the goods at prices considerably lower
than those charged by the authorized distributor.'
United States trademark owners contend that gray market dealers
pirate the goodwill established by the trademark owners in their busi-
nesses. With little financial spending, the gray market dealer capitalizes
on "the benefits of the substantial investment of the United States dis-
* J.D., 1991, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 A trademark is a word, design or picture used in connection with goods or ser-
vices that represents the reputation or goodwill of the manufacturer or provider and
signifies the quality of its goods or services. The mark therefore provides useful infor-
mation for the consumer and aids in marketplace competition.
While this Comment focuses exclusively on the gray market's operation in the
context of trademark law, gray market imports of copyrighted material have also in-
creased in recent years. See Donohue, The Use of Copyright Laws To Prevent the Im-
portation of "Genuine Goods", 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 183 (1986); Note,
Parallel Importing Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
113 (1984) (both reviewing the general approach utilized by courts analyzing copyright
charges filed against gray market goods). See also Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988); Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v.
Taito Corp., No. 88-0156-A (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Courts file); Neutrogena Corp. v. United States, No. 88-0566-1 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F.
Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (for recent attempts to use copyright
law to block gray market imports).
' W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Ind., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
3 See Cleary and Landau, Gray Market Litigation: Battling the "Graying" of
America, TRIAL, Mar. 1989, at 22 ("[t]he market for gray goods exists because both
U.S. and foreign manufacturers often charge U.S. distributors as much as 40 percent
more than foreign distributors for the same goods").
(457)
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tributor to establish consumer awareness and maintain product qual-
ity."4 Companies spend considerable time and effort promoting the
goodwill of their products, 5 a cost reflected in the products' selling
prices. The United States dealer has spent a great amount on advertis-
ing, quality inspections, and providing warranties and repair services.
When the same products are purchased in a foreign market and im-
ported into the United States, the gray marketeer is getting a free ride
at the trademark owner's expense, as the United States consumer has
purchased the gray good expecting the "extras" provided by the author-
ized United States distributor. At least one court has held that free rid-
ing, which causes a drastic decline in sales and an increase in consumer
confusion, is a sufficient basis for a preliminary injunction barring the
importation and sales of the gray market goods.'
Not only do gray market sales pirate the established goodwill, such
sales endanger the trademark owner's business reputation and goodwill
by placing them in the hands of another business over which it has no
control. Goodwill is damaged when, for example, the gray market ver-
sion of a product lacks a warranty equivalent to that of the authorized
dealer's good.' Other examples include non-English instructions,' lack
of repair servicing,' incompatibility with United States electrical cur-
rents1" and non-compliance with United States health and safety
codes. 1 Goods that are not transported properly, particularly cameras,
watches and electronic equipment, may not conform to the expectation
of the buyer.12 Furthermore, the availability of items in discount stores
arguably diminishes their prestige and results in consumer hostility di-
rected toward the trademark. The availability of a lower-priced good is
perceived by consumers as price-gouging on the part of the United
States trademark owner. The lower price also contributes to consumers'
belief that the good is, in fact, a lower-quality good than what they
thought they had purchased at the higher price. In all of these circum-
" Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. INT'L COMP. L. 231, 234 (1984).
5 See, e.g., Baldo, Score One for the Gray Market, FORBES, Feb. 25, 1985, at 74
(reporting that Duracell, a domestic trademark owner involved in recent gray market
litigation, spent $150 million in promoting its United States market).
6 See Osawa Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See id.
See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68
(2d Cir. 1987).
9 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163.
10 See Gilman, No Guarantees for Guarantees in Gray Market, Wall St. J., Feb.
5, 1985, at 33, col. 3.
'1 See id.
12 See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1984).
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stances, the trademark owner's goodwill has been reduced by the gray
market good. To avoid consumer resentment and disturbing the good-
will, the trademark owner is often forced to perform free warranty ser-
vice or to honor rebate offers for gray goods.
It is in response to this consumer hostility and diminished goodwill
that the trademark owners seek recovery. Their claim is based upon the
Lockean principle that an owner should not be deprived of the benefits
of the goodwill obtained by the expenditure of energy, time and
money.'3
Proponents of parallel imports 4 argue that the gray market has
placed many formerly unaffordable goods within the reach of more con-
sumers. 5 However, the hidden costs and risks associated with gray
market goods must be considered in an accurate assessment of the bene-
fits to consumers1 6
The gray market has expanded dramatically in the last ten
years,'7 a fact initially attributable to the United States dollar's rise in
value relative to foreign currencies. 8 The estimated size of the gray
market' 9 and the variety of goods involved2" have given rise to heated
IS See Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Protection Against Gray Market
Goods Under 19 U.S.C. Section 1526, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 179, 198 (1986).
14 Gray market goods are also known as parallel imports because of their distribu-
tion route - from lower-priced foreign markets into the United States to be sold in
direct competition with the goods of the authorized United States distributors. See
Cleary & Landau, supra note 3, at 22. Gray market dealers prefer this term because it
is less suggestive of any impropriety on their part.
1" For example, one retailer claims that its ability to deal in the gray market
allows it to offer to its consumers Seiko watches for only $100 that would normally sell
for $195 through authorized channels. Note, Gray Marketeers: Pirates of Goodwill or
Vendors of Value?, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 255, 257.
" Gray market goods often lack the warranties, instructions, and servicing ex-
pected by the consumer. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
17 Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7,
1985, at 89.
18 Nolan-Haley, supra note 4, at 232; Baldo, supra note 5, at 74. See, e.g., Why
Camera Prices Are Falling, Bus. WK., Sept. 6, 1982, at 61, 64 (comparing the gray
market business in cameras to the commodity exchange as dealers watch foreign ex-
change rates and then traffic their cameras accordingly). But see Address by Mike Noll,
Second Ann. Jud. Conf. of the U.S. Ct. of Int'l Trade (Oct. 23, 1985), reported in 31
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 755, at 36 (Nov. 14, 1985) (expres-
sing the position of the International Trade Commission that economic considerations
do not support gray market imports, rather the "price differences are justified by differ-
ences in services and investment [and] gr[a]y market goods get a 'free ride' on the repu-
tation enjoyed by the mark as a result of efforts undertaken by its U.S. owner"). Propo-
nents of gray market goods contend that the higher domestic prices are due to
"deliberate price discrimination strategies pursued by trademark owners." Smart,
Squaring the Gray Goods Circle, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1963, 1966 (1989).
" See Riley, "Gray Market" Fight Isn't Black and White, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28,
1985, at 1, col. 3 (estimating the size of the gray market at ten billion dollars annually).
See also Boyer, supra note 17, at 89 (estimating the size of the gray market to be six
1991]
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debates concerning the merits of a system which incorporates such
goods.
This Comment contends that the current law, which almost al-
ways permits gray market importation, is in need of revision. Part 2 of
this Comment provides an overview of the presently available means of
resolving the situation. Additionally, Part 2 presents the limitations of
the existing law which prevent it from properly balancing the rights of
the United States trademark owners with those of the gray market im-
porters and the United States consumers.21 Part 3 of this Comment
proposes a solution that would more adequately protect the rights of
the United States trademark owner without drastically reducing the
benefits that the United States consumer receives from the importation
of gray market goods.22
2. SURVEY OF EXISTING METHODS OF COMBATTING THE GRAY
MARKET
The United States trademark owner whose goods are forced into
intra-brand competition may find remedies in several areas of law. His-
torically, trademark law2" has been employed, with varying degrees of
success, as the primary method of attack on gray goods. The contro-
versy over gray goods first arose in 1922 in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Kat-
ze124 and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge.25 In both cases, the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial courts' orders enjoining the importation of gray
goods. However, trademark law can only effectively block gray goods
upon a showing of confusion in the mind of the public with regard to
the goods in commerce. 26 In the event of genuine goods, a finding of
billion dollars per year); Crister, Trade War Erupts in Gray-Market Goods, INC.,
Mar. 1986, at 19 (estimating that the total value of the market in these goods is eight
billion dollars annually).
20 For a sampling of the types of goods involved, see A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
260 U.S. 689 (1923) (cosmetics); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d
Cir. 1986) (photographic equipment); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F.
Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985) (fine porcelain); United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F.
Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (perfumes); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1886) (mineral water); In re Certain Soft Sculpture Dolls Popularly Known as "Cab-
bage Patch Kids," Related Literature and Packaging Therefor, 9 I.T.R.D. (BNA)
1292 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1986) (dolls); Goodgame, Inside the Gray Market,
TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 76 (construction equipment).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 23-115.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 116-132.
23 Trademarks are currently governed by the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
24 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
28 292 F. 1013 (2d Cir. 1922), affd per curiam, 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
28 See J. MCCARTHY, 1 TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:6 (2d ed.
1984) (asserting that the "property in a trademark is the right to prevent confusion").
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trademark infringement is not likely.27 Therefore, this Comment asserts
that trademark law does not afford the United States trademark owner
sufficient certainty of protection and relief from gray marketeers.28
Trademark owners receive some protection through the exclusion
of gray market goods at customs. Section 526 of the Tariff Act prohibits
the importation of such goods."9 However, the Customs Service has,
under the Tariff Act,s° promulgated regulations which prevent the ex-
clusion of gray goods in a variety of circumstances."1 These regulations
limit the effectiveness of Customs law as a weapon for United States
trademark owners in their war against parallel importers."2
The International Trade Commission recently investigated several
gray market cases33 in which the trademark owners claimed unfair
competition. 3' The Commission however, operates under limitations 5
preventing it from bringing certainty to this complicated area of the
'" Steiner & Sabath, Intellectual Property and Trade Law Approaches to Gray
Market Importation, and the Restructuring of Transnational Entities To Permit
Blockage of Gray Goods in the United States, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 433, 440
(1989).
s See infra text accompanying notes 37-84.
2 The Tariff Act of 1930 is codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1677 (1988). The Act
provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, pack-
age, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of...
the United States,... unless written consent of the owner of such trade-
mark is produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988).
30 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (1988) authorizes the making of such rules and regulations as
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.
31 According to the regulations, articles of foreign or domestic manufacture, bear-
ing marks similar to United States trademarks, may not be denied entry when:
(1) [b]oth the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by
the same person or business entity;
(2) [tjhe foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership
or control; [or]
(3) [t]he articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1990) (note that additional exceptions exist which have not
been reproduced here).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 85-110.
30 Cabbage Patch Kids, supra note 20; In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 6
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
3, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988) declares unlawful any "lu]nfair methods of
competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles" into the United States, the
intent of which is "to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States."
35 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (1988) (empowering the President to disap-
prove, for policy reasons, any determination of the International Trade Commission,
potentially rendering ineffective any action taken).
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law."6 The following more detailed analysis indicates the existing law's
ineffectiveness in protecting the rights of United States trademark own-
ers and consumers.
2.1. Protection Under Trademark Law
2.1.1. The Territoriality Theory of Trademarks
Prior to 1923, there were no limitations on the importation of for-
eign merchandise bearing trademarks identical to trademarks registered
in the United States." In the seminal case of A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Katzel, 8 the Supreme Court held that, under certain circumstances, a
third party's importation of trademarked goods from a foreign manu-
facturer could be enjoined. In Katzel, a French cosmetic manufacturer
sold its United States face powder business, its goodwill and its United
States trademarks to the plaintiff, a United States distributor. 9 The
defendant, finding the rate of exchange unfavorable, began purchasing
the powder overseas from the French manufacturer and importing it
into the United States, selling it in packaging similar to that of the
United States trademark owner.40 The United States distributor
showed that it had expended considerable effort in establishing goodwill
for its business in the United States4 1 and claimed trademark infringe-
ment under, section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905.42 Justice
Holmes, writing for the unanimous Court, recognized that the product
"was sold and could only be sold with the good will of the business that
the plaintiff bought."'43 On that basis, the Court enjoined the defend-
ant's imports.44
The Court adopted what has come to be termed the "territorial-
3 See infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
3 See, e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916)
(holding that a registered United States trademark for violin strings was not infringed
by one who sold the genuine violin strings labeled with that trademark in the United
States though he had not obtained them in Germany with the mark intact); Apollinaris
Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (denying an injunction to restrain de-
fendant's importation of mineral water purchased in Germany and sold in the same
packaging registered to the United States trademark owner who had contracted for the
exclusive right to import the water from Germany).
38 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
39 Id. at 690.
40 Id. at 691.
41 Id.
42 That section was the predecessor to the current section 42 of the Lanham Act,
which provides, in relevant part, that "no article of imported merchandise . . . shall
copy or simulate a trademark .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
4' Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
44 Justice Holmes went so far as to analogize the rights in trademark to the mo-
nopoly obtained through patent. Id.
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ity" theory of trademarks - the notion that "a trademark has a sepa-
rate legal existence under each country's laws and its proper function is
to symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic mark holder."'45 The
Court recognized that a trademark serves as more than an indication of
the physical origin of a product; the trademark represents the indepen-
dent goodwill of the trademark holder in a particular market.46
Congress, too, has recognized the territoriality principle as evi-
denced by its 1962 amendment to section 32 of the Lanham Act.,"
Prior to this amendment, plaintiffs in trademark infringement actions
were required to show consumer confusion as to the source of origin of
the products (i.e., confusion as to the manufacturer). 48 Congress elimi-
nated the "source of origin" language,49 clarifying its intent to include,
as possible infringement, the use of trademarks which would be likely
to cause confusion or mistakes of any kind, even as to the identity of the
person or entity ensuring the quality of the goods in the United
States.50 The territoriality principle has even been extended into the
international realm.5"
2.1.2. Gray Market Goods Under the Lanham Trademark Act
a. In General
Today, most gray market cases pursuing a cause of action under
the Lanham Act52 rely on sections 32 and 43(a). 51 Section 32 protects
1" Note, The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 838, 841 (1986) [hereinafter Consumer Interests].
46 For a listing of other cases and commentators recognizing the territoriality the-
ory, see id. at 841 n.16.
47 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
41 Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 706 (D.N.J. 1985).
41 Section 32 currently provides in part that:
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrant[,] use in com-
merce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a reg-
istered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall
be liable in a civil action by the registrant.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1988).
50 See Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568
(2d Cir. 1971); Well Ceramics, 618 F. Supp. at 706.
61 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised July 14,
1967, art. 6(3), 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 ("[a] mark duly registered in a
country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other
countries of the Union, including the country of origin").
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
" Palladino, Gray Market Goods: The United States Trademark Owners' View,
79 TRADEMARK REP. 158, 159 (1988).
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the trademark owner against the use of a trademark that is a reproduc-
tion, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark and
that is likely to deceive or cause confusion or mistake.54 Section 43(a)
protects the owner of a registered or unregistered trademark against
false designation of origin, false description or misrepresentation that is
likely to damage that trademark owner. 5
Trademark owners have been generally unsuccessful in combatting
gray market goods with either of the two provisions. By its terms, sec-
tion 3256 implicates only reproductions, counterfeits, copies or imita-
tions of registered marks, not gray goods since they bear legitimate
trademarks. The controversy surrounding gray goods does not concern
their trademark status, rather, it focuses on the importer's free riding
on the authorized United States distributor's goodwill. 57 Consequently,
section 43(a)'s58 false designation of origin provision enhances the
trademark owners' chance of recovery. Under that section, a gray mar-
ket good can be banned when it materially differs from that of the
United States trademark owner.59 Furthermore, it appears to protect
the United States trademark owner against virtually identical products
provided that the owner could show established goodwill separate from
that of the gray good, even where the gray good is virtually identical.60
However, the aforementioned regulations promulgated by the United
States Customs Service further limit the protection given to the United
5" The text of section 32 is provided in part supra note 49.
51 Section 43(a) provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,... uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, . . . or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
56 See supra note 49.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 4-13.
5 See supra note 55.
See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816
F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Dial Corp. v. Manghnani
Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F.
Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19
(S.D. Fla. 1985).
0 -See, e.g., Premier Dental Prod. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v.
Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp.
1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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States trademark owner."1
b. Case Law Under the Lanham Trademark Act
To succeed in an action brought pursuant to either section 32 or
43(a), the plaintiff-trademark owner must demonstrate the existence of
a likelihood of confusing the consumer. Inevitably, the courts' decisions
are heavily fact-based, with some trademark owners succeeding and
others being denied relief.62 In the cases dealing with goods that are not
genuine, the courts have readily determined that there is a likelihood of
confusion and have prohibited the importation of such goods. For ex-
ample, in Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp.6" and Dial Corp. v.
Encina Corp.,64 the respective courts found that modified6 5 Dial soap
bars were likely to confuse the public in violation of section 32 and
concluded that the sale of such bars constituted a false designation of
origin in violation of section 43(a). Furthermore, the Connecticut Dis-
trict Court recognized that confusion could even be found where the
imported goods were genuine.66
In Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp.,67 the court enjoined
United States sales of Canadian-made Trivial Pursuit games. The
court was influenced by the United States trademark owner's exclusive
license to manufacture and sell the games in the United States and its
modifications of the games to include its logo on the packaging, and,
more importantly, a desire to eliminate certain questions from the Ca-
nadian version that were deemed unsuitable for family participation.
6 8
Although, as in Manghnani, the goods were not identical, the
Southern Florida District Court in Selchow invoked the territoriality
theory because it recognized that identical goods could confuse the
consumer:
6 9
" For a more detailed discussion of the Customs regulations, see supra text ac-
companying notes 85-110.
82 See MCCARTHY, supra note 26.
63 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987).
6' 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
'5 The imported version of the soap differed from genuine, domestically manufac-
tured Dial soap in antibacterial and deodorant effectiveness, size, and fragrance. See
Manghnani, 659 F. Supp. at 1234.
" Manghnani, 659 F. Supp. at 1238 (dictuim). The court noted that even if a
good were genuine, it could nevertheless deceive the public into believing that the do-
mestic markholder's goodwill, as established through advertising, sales and servicing,
stood behind the product. Id. (citing Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F.
Supp. 700, 704-05 (D.N.J. 1985)).
6P7 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
68 Id. at 28-29.
e See supra text accompanying notes 37-51 (discussing the territoriality theory of
trademark).
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[A] trademark represents the local or domestic goodwill of
the owner of the national mark. Identical goods imported
from another country are apt to confuse domestic buyers of
the goods as to their origin. If the foreign goods are dam-
aged, or are without a warranty, or are not of the same
quality as the domestic goods, the goodwill and reputation of
the domestic owner of the mark is injured."0
Courts are sometimes willing to find a likelihood of confusion
based upon ancillary features of products when the genuineness of the
goods is unclear. For example, in Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc.," the sale of Cabbage Patch Kids dolls
accompanied by non-English language instructions and adoption papers
was found to cause confusion among consumers. This was indicated by
customer complaints, resulting in damage to the plaintiff's goodwill.
The court was willing to apply the territoriality principle in finding
infringement despite the fact that a single entity owned the trademark
worldwide.1 2 The court realized that the significance of the United
States trademark was the service it represented." For example, the
processing of the adoption papers, enabling a doll's "parent" to receive
a birth certificate and a first birthday card for the doll, could not be
accomplished with the non-English language papers.
Unfortunately for trademark owners, not all courts are so recep-
tive to the territoriality theory of trademarks. So while trademark own-
ers are adequately protected by existing law in the event of modified or
non-genuine goods, such is generally not the case when genuine goods
are involved.74 In NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco,"5 the Ninth Circuit
expressed its view that "[t]rademark law generally does not reach the
sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though such sale is
without the mark owner's consent."'7 6 In that case the plaintiff, which
had exclusive United States distributorship of the chips, was a wholly
owned United States subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturer of semi-
conductor computer chips which were sold worldwide under the NEC
trademark. 77 The plaintiff brought an action under sections 3278 and
70 Selchow, 612 F. Supp. at 28.
71 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987).
72 See id. at 73.
72 See id.
"' Steiner & Sabath, supra note 27, at 440.
76 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 436 (1987).
71 NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1509.
7 See id. at 1507.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988).
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43(a)7' of the Lanham Act against a third party that had purchased the
parent company's chips abroad and sold them in the United States in
direct competition with the plaintiff's chips and under the same mark.
The Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the sale of the gray market chips
despite evidence indicating that United States purchasers 'of the im-
ported chips mistakenly thought their chips were protected by the ser-
vicing and warranties of the authorized United States distributor."s
When such consumer confusion exists the United States trademark
owner's goodwill is put at risk. Consumers grow hostile toward the
trademark when denied the warranty and servicing expected. This hos-
tility is then directed toward the good and, indirectly, toward the
United States trademark owner. Although the decision is only binding
on the Ninth Circuit, its implications are far-reaching, especially since
that circuit contains many critical points of entry into the United States
for gray market goods, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle
and Honolulu.
The courts' ability to dismiss customer confusion, as in CAL Abco,
clarifies the need for legislation protecting the interests of both trade-
mark owners and consumers. Trademark owners spend a great deal of
time and money promoting the goodwill of their products. Allowing
gray marketeers such easy entrance into the United States, as the Ninth
Circuit did, diminishes the ability of United States trademark owners to
maintain their goodwill with the public. This gives rise to greater cus-
tomer dissatisfaction, and, in the long run, hurts the consumer who is
left to receive products of lower-than-expected quality, lacking in war-
ranties and servicing. Even in the event of identical goods, it is impera-
tive that consumers receive the "extras" they have come to expect.8"
Although some courts invoke the territoriality theory, 2 they are
outnumbered by those that altogether reject the notion that genuine
goods can cause public confusion. 83 In foreclosing the possibility of a
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
80 See NEC Elecs., 810 F.2d at 1508.
S1 Such "extras" include warranties, servicing, instructions, rebates, and compli-
ance with United States safety, health and electrical standards. See notes 7-12 and ac-
companying text.
82 See, e.g., Premier Dental Prod. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v.
Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp.
1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
83 See, e.g., NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.
1987); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983);
DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1980); American Honda
Motor Co. v. Carolina Autosports Leasing & Sales, 645 F. Supp. 863 (W.D.N.C.
1986); Parfums Stem, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.
Fla. 1983).
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trademark action against genuine goods, courts fail to recognize the
ability of a domestic markholder to develop a separate and independent
goodwill for the product. 4
This Comment asserts that the courts have rendered the current
trademark law ineffective in combatting the infringement of the United
States trademark owners' rights. The courts have succeeded in remov-
ing all certainty and predictability of relief for domestic markholders in
the event of infringement by gray market goods.
2.2. Protection By Exclusion at Customs
Theoretically, gray marketeers can be enjoined from importing
their goods by the United States Customs Service.85 From its inception,
this area of customs law has been intertwined with the case law under
the Trademark Act of 19058 and later, with the case law under the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946. 17 Section 526 of the Tariff Act of
19308" was added as a result of the intermediary court's decision in A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.89 In that appellate decision, the Second Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's order9" enjoining the importation of
face powder."' The court reasoned as follows:
Trade-marks . . . are intended to show without any time
limit the origin of the goods they mark, so that the owner
and the public may be protected against the sale of one
man's goods as the goods of another man. If the goods sold
are the genuine goods covered by the trade-mark, the rights
of the owner of the trade-mark are not infringed. 2
The legislative history of section 526 reveals Congress's concern
" But see Comment, Gray Market Imports: A Genuine Problem for the United
States Trademark Owner, Customs Service, and Courts, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
762, 781 (1986) (arguing that the cases denying protection against genuine goods
should not be considered persuasive for the proposition that genuine goods cannot cause
confusion).
85 See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988), reproduced supra note 29.
86 The Trademark Act of 1905 was the predecessor of the current trademark law
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
s7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
s The Tariff Act of 1930 was codified as 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1677 (1988). In
particular, section 526 was codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988) [hereinafter section
5261.
275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
274 F. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
• See supra text accompanying notes 39-41 (providing a more detailed discussion
of the facts of the case).
92 275 F.- at 543.
[Vol. 12:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss3/5
GRAY MARKET
with the intermediary Katzel decision:9
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that
existing law does not prevent the importation of merchandise
bearing the same trade-mark as merchandise of the United
States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and if there is
no fraud on the public. The Senate amendment makes such
importation unlawful without the consent of the owner of
the American trade-mark, in order to protect the American
manufacturer or producer . . ..
Although clearly concerned with the Second Circuit's decision,
Congress did not elaborate on the scope of proposed Section 526. Cus-
toms subsequently promulgated regulations that created exceptions" to
the law of section 526.96
The regulations employ a relationship-based rationale clearly
enunciated in United States v. Guerlain, Inc.9 7 In that case, the court,
motivated in part by concern with monopoly and antitrust principles,
denied protection to a United States company on the grounds that it
was part of a single international business enterprise with a foreign
company. The most common exception to the section 526 ban on im-
portation occurs when a relationship exists between the foreign trade-
mark owner and the United States trademark owner.98 Such a regula-
tion is troublesome for its assumption that any party holding the rights
' Note that in the Supreme Court's eventual reversal of the Second Circuit, no
reference was made to the recently passed legislation. However, the Court reached a
decision in accordance with section 526, by viewing trademarks as not only indicators of
the original, physical source of the product but also as indicators of those through
whose hands the goods have passed. 260 U.S. at 692.
' H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
" Such regulations were first promulgated in 1936, and the exceptions were
broadened in 1953 and 1959. In 1972, Customs adopted the current version. The ex-
ceptions originated in United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). Guerlain was a wholly owned United States subsidiary which sold perfumes
purchased from its French parent company at a higher price than that at which they
were sold at overseas. The United States Government charged the exclusive United
States distributor with violating section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1988), which provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize ... any part of the
trade or commerce with foreign nations shall be guilty of a felony." The distributor
then sought protection under section 526 of the Tariff Act. The district court held that
section 526 could not be invoked by a United States company that was part of a single
international business enterprise with a foreign company. 155 F. Supp. at 91. The
court determined that Guerlain's invocation of section 526 was for the purpose of ex-
cluding competition and controlling price levels and was, therefore, a monopolization.
Id. at 90-91.
See supra note 31 (enumerating the most commonly employed exceptions).
155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
' See supra note 31.
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to a United States trademark and affiliated with a foreign concern is
trying to take advantage of the United States consumer.
In response to the regulations, trademark owners began seeking
declaratory judgments that the Customs regulations had invalidly inter-
preted section 526.91 In Olympus Corp. v. United States,' and Vivitar
Corp. v. United States,'' the Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and the Federal Circuit, respectively, upheld the validity of the Cus-
toms regulations. However, it would be inaccurate to characterize ei-
ther decision as a whole-hearted endorsement of the regulations. One
commentator has analyzed the decisions as upholding the validity of the
regulations, but only "with the caveat that these regulations do not
limit a United States trademark owner's right to pursue a private cause
of action."'0 2 In other words, even though the regulations may be ques-
tionable, they were upheld because of the availability of other means by
which recourse could be had - namely, the trademark law. However,
in examining the trademark owners' private remedies under the Lan-
ham Act, this Comment concludes that such remedies are ineffective.'
03
Furthermore, in reaching its decision, the Second Circuit adopted the
argument that Congress's refusal to act (i.e., to strike down the regula-
tions) indicates its approval of the regulations as consistent with the
Act.'0 However, an equally strong (or weak) argument can be made
that Congress' failure to incorporate the regulations into the statute in-
dicates its rejection of the regulations. The argument is equivocal at
best.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the validity of the Customs
regulations in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.10 5 In this complicated
consolidation of three cases, a plurality of the Court drew the line be-
tween lawful and unlawful gray market imports, finding the regula-
tions valid insofar as they permitted the importation of gray goods
where the United States trademark owner had authorized an unaffili-
ated company to use the mark overseas. In other words, the regulations
99 Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 792
F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition To Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281 (1988); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) affid 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
100 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
101 761 F.2d 1552 (2d Cir. 1985).
102 Palladino, supra note 53, at 179.
103 See text accompanying notes 53-84.
1o4 792 F.2d at 320. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (presuming consis-
tency of an administrative interpretation with its authorizing statute when Congress
knows of the agency interpretation and refuses to act).
105 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
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were upheld, except for the authorized use exception. Economically, the
Supreme Court's decision will have little effect on the gray market as
only a negligible portion of all gray market imports can be categorized
into this exception." 6
Under the Court's ruling, as long as a relationship can be shown
to exist between the United States trademark owner and the foreign
trademark owner, goods cannot be banned. The decision even denies
the protection of the Tariff Act where the gray marketeer is a third
party unrelated to the United States trademark owner or its foreign
affiliate. Much debate has arisen over the logic of such line drawing.
There are many instances in which a United States subsidiary of a
foreign manufacturer is a substantial enterprise in its own right." 7 The
regulation unfairly presumes monopolistic practices and price discrimi-
nation tactics on their part. Often, the higher price in the United States
market is justifiably attributed to added features of the products in-
tended for the United States market.'0 8 Allowing the distributors of the
gray goods a free ride on the goodwill of the United States trademark
owner strips the trademark owner of the rights in the mark. The
Court's decision is therefore unsatisfactory for its lack of logically based
line drawing'0 9 and failure to address the issue of the private course of
action available to trademark owners." 0 Trademark owners are effec-
tively left with the diluted protection offered by section 526 of the
Tariff Act and the inconsistent protection of the courts under the Lan-
ham Trademark Act.
2.3. Protection Given by the International Trade Commission
Recently, the International Trade Commission"' has addressed
the issue of gray market goods. Trademark owners have had some posi-
tive results."' However, in In re Certain Alkaline Batteries,"3 the In-
106 See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1988, at D6, col. 1.
107 See, e.g., Allen, The Supreme Court's Gray Market Decision, 70 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK Soc'y 688, 693 (1988) (refuting the notion that United States distributors
are "mere corporate shells").
108 See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
109 See Note, The Current State of the United States Gray Market: The Common-
Control Exception Survives, For Now, 54 Mo. L. REv. 413, 422 (1989); Allen, supra
note 107, at 695.
..o As noted by J. Kennedy, the issue of inconsistency between the regulations and
the Lanham Trademark Act was not before the Court. 486 U.S. at 286 n.3.
... The International Trade Commission was created in 1930 as the United States
Tariff Commission and was given authority to investigate, review and exclude from
entry "articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered
under the Trademark Act of 1946." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(1)(a)-(d) (1988).
"I See, e.g., supra note 20.
113 6 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1849 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
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ternational Trade Commission found that a United States trademark
had been infringed by gray goods that, because of transportation condi-
tions, were inferior to the similarly trademarked batteries for sale in the
United States." 4 On its facts, the case seemed ideal for banning, the
remedy eventually ordered by the Commission. Not only were the
rights and goodwill of the United States trademark owner threatened,
but so were the rights of the United States consumers to receive a prod-
uct of expected quality. However, President Reagan overturned the
Commission's resolution of this issue for what he ambiguously termed
"policy reasons." These reasons were never disclosed,' 15 thus further
manifesting the uncertainty and unpredictability plaguing this potential
means of recourse for United States trademark owners and consumers.
3. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
As demonstrated, United States trademark owners who have built
up independent goodwill in this market are inadequately shielded from
unauthorized parties seeking to profit at the markholders' expense.
While one may sympathize with the trademark owners, they are enti-
tled to no recourse except in those situations in which the goodwill they
have established is threatened. After all, it is in the best interest of
consumers to allow them to obtain the same products at lower prices by
shopping elsewhere.
Several members of Congress have recently introduced bills in-
tended to clarify this gray area of the law. In 1988, Senator Hatch
introduced Senate Bill S. 2903, otherwise known as the "Trademark
Protection Act of 1988." ' 6 Senator Hatch summarized the proposed
amendment to the Lanham Act as follows:
Under its provisions the Lanham Trademark Act is amended
to provide that no person may import into or sell within the
United States any good that is manufactured outside the
United States if that good bears a trademark that is identical
to a trademark owned and properly registered by a person,
corporation, or other entity, unless the U.S. trademark
owner consents to such sale or importation.
This prohibition would apply regardless of whether the
foreign manufacturer of the goods or foreign trademark
114 Id.
1"5 The President has the authority to disapprove determinations of the Commis-
sion. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0)(2) (1988).
"11 S. 2903, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). See S. 1671, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (aiming to abolish the gray market altogether).
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owner whose trademark appears on the goods is related in
any way to the owner of the U.S. trademark. The prohibi-
tion would also apply regardless of whether the owner of the
U.S. trademark owns or has registered the trademark
abroad. And, finally, the prohibition would apply regardless
of whether the owner of U.S. trademark has authorized the
use of the trademark abroad.1
17
That same year, Representative Chandler introduced a bill into
the House of Representatives" 8 that, if enacted, would have incorpo-
rated the existing Customs regulations"19 into section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.120 The bill was the counterpart to an earlier bill Senator
Chaffee had introduced in the Senate in 1987.21
Neither side of this debate has been able to advance its view suc-
cessfully. This Comment contends that to be successful in resolving the
gray market situation, legislation must effect some sort of compromise
rather than emphasizing either extreme view.
Before legislation can be drafted, the interests of all parties must
be evaluated. Then, appropriate means for protecting the interests must
be determined. United States consumers have a strong interest in pay-
ing the lowest price available for a genuine good. The consumers, how-
ever, have certain expectations with respect to warranties, servicing, re-
bates, and compliance with United States health and safety standards
which must be met.'22 In turn, United States trademark owners right-
fully expect that the goodwill of their products will not be undercut by
goods bearing the same trademark, but of lesser quality or lacking in
features such as warranties and servicing. However, the trademark
owners' rights cannot extend so far as to ban those imported goods
which are genuine in all respects and in which consumer expectations
are satisfied. Giving such an unlimited right to trademark owners
would provide them with monopolistic powers.'2  Furthermore, the
"1 134 CONG. REC. S17043, 17044 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
118 H.R. 4803, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
" 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1989) (reproduced supra note 31).
120 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988).
"I S. 1097, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), based upon S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
1' See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
123 One commentator has written that:
[ijf trademark law were found to prohibit gray market imports in their
entirety,... a firm with foreign affiliates could use it to implement price
discrimination against domestic markets. By prohibiting gray marketeers
attracted by price disparities from arbitraging genuine "foreign" goods be-
tween international markets, the trademark owner could create a wall
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presumptions underlying the existing regulations issued by the Customs
Service are unfair to trademark owners and should not form the pre-
mise of any proposed legislation. The regulations presume price dis-
crimination against United States consumers in the event of related do-
mestic and foreign companies. 24
This Comment urges the adoption of the California Gray Market
Goods Act' 25 (the Act) as a starting point in developing legislation . 26
The Act requires all those ifivolved in the retail selling of gray market
goods to make certain affirmative disclosures about gray market mer-
chandise. The Act further mandates posting a conspicuous sign at the
product's point of display and affixing to the product a conspicuous
label disclosing certain information when appropriate, including the in-
applicability' of the manufacturer's warranty, incompatibility with
United States electrical currents or broadcast frequencies, unavailability
of replacement parts or compatible accessories, absence of English in-
structions, ineligibility for manufacturer's rebate, and any other non-
conformity with relevant domestic standards known to the seller.'
2 7
The Act, as evidenced by its provisions, was clearly designed to
protect consumer interests. However, it contains several ambiguities
that prevent it from providing complete protection. First, by its terms,
the Act only applies to "retail sellers"; an importer or wholesaler prob-
ably would not be subject to the penalization (i.e., liability to the
buyer 12 and possible charges of unfair competition129).
Furthermore, the definition of "gray market goods" unnecessarily
limits them to consumer goods, imported into the United States via un-
between the markets, preventing a crossing over of products.
Comment, Applying Grecian Formula to International Trade: K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REV. 1397, 1418-19
(1989) (footnotes omitted).
124 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1),(2) (1989) (per se allows entrance of imported
goods originating in companies related to the United States distributor). See also K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988) (finding sufficient ambiguity in
the authorizing statute to support the construction adopted by Customs in its
regulations).
125 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1797.8-.86 (West Supp. 1986).
128 Only two other states, New York and Connecticut, have adopted similar legis-
lation addressing their concern for the unprotected consumer. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 218-aa (McKinney Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-210 (West 1987).
After considering the benefits and drawbacks of the three statutes, the California legis-
lation was included in Suggested State Legislation, the purpose of which is to provide
guidance for states during their legislative process. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'Ts, 47
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 302 (1988). Therefore, this Comment will focus on
the California statute.
12 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1797.81(a)(1)-(8) (West 1988).
12S Id. at § 1797.85.
129 Id. at § 1797.86.
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authorized channels, bearing a trademark and, though normally accom-
panied by an express written warranty, not accompanied by any such
warranty. 30 Gray marketeers can use this limiting definition to exclude
their goods from the category. Since the modification of goods often
voids the entire manufacturer's warranty, modified goods will no longer
fit the definition of gray market goods and the retailer will not be
bound. Clearly, these ambiguities need to be resolved to fully protect
the consumer.
The California statute also raises serious constitutional difficulties
by imposing a state statute on a foreign or out-of-state entity. 3 ' There-
fore, this Comment recommends adopting, at the federal level, legisla-
tion similar to that of California but without its ambiguities. The pro-
posed legislation should apply to a more inclusive group - all those
involved in parallel importation. Furthermore, the term "gray market
goods" must be defined in a way that precludes gray marketeers from
manipulating it. This Comment proposes eliminating the warranty re-
quirement contained in the California definition. Instead, the following
definition is recommended: consumer goods which are imported into the
United States through channels other than the manufacturer's author-
ized United States distributor and which bear a trademark. Such a defi-
nition is broad enough to be free from manipulation.
The California statute, although clearly cognizant of consumer in-
terests, does not directly address the concerns of trademark owners.
Adopting the labeling policy will diminish the consumer confusion that
results in free riding.'32 To say, however, that the confusion would be
altogether eliminated would be misleading. Even with strict labeling
requirements, there exists the strong possibility that the consumer will
be dissatisfied with the gray good and will direct such hostility at the
trademark in general. There must be a remedy for the trademark
owner in such an instance; or better yet, such an instance must be
prevented.
Section 526 of the Tariff Act would seem to provide the best pro-
tection for owners. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the excep-
tions to that section's ban on importation based on ambiguities in its
provisions. This Comment urges Congress to reexamine section 526
and the regulations promulgated thereunder and clarify the underlying
intent. In its examination, Congress should recognize the inherent ineq-
"I0 See id. at § 1797.8(a).
... For a constitutional analysis of the California statute, see Comment, Turning
up the Contrast in a Grey Area: California Unleashes the Black Letter Grey Market
Goods Act, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 657, 676-84 (1988).
"I Consumer Interests, supra note 45, at 863.
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uity of the presumption underlying the Customs regulations. Upon
such recognition, Congress can adopt a more rational rule, looking to
factors other than the existence of a relationship between the domestic
and foreign enterprises. The nature of the relationship in a particular
case requires detailed examination. Admittedly, this burdens Customs
and the judiciary. However, this Comment posits that the slightly in-
creased burden must be accommodated in order to protect fully the
rights of United States trademark owners.
4. CONCLUSION
The size of the gray market and the variety of goods passing
through it make it an important and lasting issue. It is, therefore, im-
perative to find a solution that will accommodate the interests of United
States trademark owners in protecting their good will and the interests
of consumers in paying the lowest price possible for a good and in re-
ceiving expected product quality. This Comment recommends strict la-
beling which would adequately protect the consumer willing to take the
time to become aware of product differences. However, many consum-
ers, despite labeling, will make uniform purchases and become hostile
to the trademark. As extra protection for the markholders, the recom-
mended legislation eliminates the bright-line rule currently in place,
under which the finding of a relationship between the foreign and do-
mestic businesses precludes a ban on the imported good. In its place,
the proposal suggests a deeper inquiry into the nature of the relation-
ship to determine whether the United States mark owner should be
estopped from banning importation of the good. The recommended so-
lution will effectively protect the trademark owners' rights in their
marks without impinging on the ability of consumers to purchase the
goods of their choice.
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